The duties we have to future generations : a Gewirthian approach. by Beyleveld,  Deryck
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
10 August 2017
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Beyleveld, Deryck (2016) 'The duties we have to future generations : a Gewirthian approach.', in Human
rights and sustainability : moral responsibilities for the future. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, pp. 137-150.
Routledge studies in sustainability.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://www.routledge.com/9781138957107
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge in Human Rights and Sustainability: Moral
responsibilities for the future on 18/02/2016, available online: http://www.routledge.com/9781138957107.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
 1 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
The Duties We Have to Future Generations? A Gewirthian Approach 
 
 
Deryck Beyleveld 
Professor of Law and Bioethics, Durham Law School, Durham University, Palatine 
Centre, Stockton Road, Durham, DH1 3LE, United Kingdom. 
deryck.beyleveld@durham.ac.uk 
 
Introduction 
 
Current population growth, use of natural resources, carbon emissions, and the like, 
are threatening to produce much poorer living conditions for future generations 
(agents who do not yet exist and will not exist during our lifetimes) unless we alter 
our actions radically. Avoidably inflicting such conditions on our contemporaries 
would violate their rights. But do we have duties not to inflict these conditions on 
future generations? 
  
The claim that we do is open to challenge on a number of grounds. 
 
For example, it is not certain that future generations will share our view about what 
they have rights to because we cannot reliably predict the preferences they will 
have or the interests they will consider important enough to merit rights-protection.  
This may be called the “challenge from epistemic uncertainty”. 
 
More fundamentally, is it even coherent to think that future generations can have 
rights against us on account of the “non-identity problem” (e.g., Parfit 1987)? In 
order for an agent (Agnes) to violate the rights of another agent (Brian) by doing X, 
Agnes’ action must harm Brian by violating a duty she owes to Brian. So, because 
“ought” implies “can”, for Agnes to have a duty not to do X, she must be able to do 
something else (Y) that will not harm Brian.  Those who invoke the non-identity 
problem claim that, where Brian is a future agent and Agnes is a current agent, it is 
impossible for Agnes to do anything to Brian that will not harm him in this way. 
Suppose that, because Agnes does X, Brian will be harmed in a way that Agnes may 
not harm Cynthia (a contemporary of Agnes). Suppose that Agnes can and does do Y 
instead of X, with the result that no future agents will be harmed in the way that 
Brian will be harmed by Agnes doing X. The objection (on grounds considered in 
Part Three IV below) is that if Agnes does anything other than X, Brian will not exist. 
Therefore, Agnes cannot do anything that results in Brian existing and not being 
harmed by Agnes. Consequently, Agnes cannot have a duty to Brian to do Y rather 
than X. So Brian cannot have a right that requires Agnes to do Y. 
 
My general aim is to elucidate why, using Alan Gewirth’s Principle of Generic 
Consistency (PGC) (see Gewirth 1978), we must recognize duties to future 
generations on account of the rights they will have.  
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The chapter has three Parts. Part One outlines what the PGC prescribes. Part Two 
outlines two arguments for using the PGC to address practical issues in general, but 
will not defend these arguments in any detail as that has been done elsewhere (see, 
especially, Beyleveld 1991 and Beyleveld 2011; also, e.g., Beyleveld and Bos 2009, 
Beyleveld 2013a and 2013b).  Part Three discusses the application of the PGC to the 
issue of duties to future generations. It also explains how the PGC counters, inter 
alia, the challenge posed by epistemic uncertainty and the non-identity problem. 
  
 
Part One: The PGC 
 
The PGC grants “generic rights” (GRs) to “agents”, and only to agents. Agents are 
characterized by having the capacity and disposition to do things in order to achieve 
purposes they have chosen, which they regard as reasons for their behaviour. The 
GRs are rights to generic conditions of agency (GCAs).  GCAs are conditions agents 
need in order to be able to pursue any purposes whatsoever or to pursue them with 
any general chances of success. Thus, being deprived of a GCA will have at least 
some negative impact (either immediately or if prolonged) on the ability of an agent 
(e.g., Albert) to act at all or to act successfully regardless of the purposes that Albert is 
pursuing or might pursue. GCAs are essential or categorical instrumental 
requirements of action, needs shared by all agents regardless of their circumstances 
(i.e., needs for action that Albert has simply by virtue of being an agent). Life itself, 
mental equilibrium sufficient to permit Albert to move from merely wanting to 
achieve something to doing something to achieve it, health, food, clothing, shelter, 
and the means to these, freedom of action, the possession of accurate information, 
and the keeping of promises made to one by others, are all examples of GCAs (see 
Gewirth 1978,. 53-5). 
 
Because Albert needs assistance to defend having the GCAs when he cannot do so by 
his own unaided efforts as much as he needs non-interference with his possession, 
the GRs are both positive and negative. Because the GCAs are means for Albert to 
pursue/achieve his purposes, he is required to defend having them only for those 
purposes he chooses to pursue. For this reason, the GRs are rights under the will-
conception of rights, which is to say that they are rights to possess the objects of the 
rights (the GCAs) in accordance with the right-holder’s will. The PGC does not require 
Albert to value having the GCAs as an end in itself, but only as essential means for 
him to act/act successfully.  In other words, in any action or intention to act, Albert 
categorically ought to defend having the GCAs; but he is not categorically bound to 
defend continuing to be able to act outside of the context of currently acting or 
intending to act.  The GRs are also ordered according to how needful they are for 
agency (see Gewirth 1978, 338-54, esp. 343-50), measured by how drastic the 
negative generic effects of being deprived of them are on Albert’s ability to act at 
all/act successfully. Gewirth distinguishes between basic rights (to the conditions 
needed to act at all, like life), non-subtractive rights (to the conditions needed to 
maintain an ability to act successfully, like accurate information) and additive rights 
(to the conditions needed to improve Albert’s ability to act successfully, like further 
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education) (see Gewirth 1978, 53-5). Within these categories, GRs can also be 
ranked according to how extensive or immediate the negative generic effect of 
deprivation of the GCA would be on action/successful action. Gewirth generally 
refers to the GCAs under the headings of “freedom and well-being” (see 1978, 
passim). But the argument for the PGC is best conducted in terms of the wholly 
abstract idea of a GCA, with concrete specification of the GCAs and how they are 
ordered being left to application of the principle. In concreto, what constitutes a GCA 
can vary according the contingent circumstances and characteristics of the agent. So 
if aquatic agents exist, air will not be a GCA for them as it is for us. Also, what can 
impact on an agent’s GCAs can vary. So, for example, a tall agent might not need a 
ladder to reach food, whereas a shorter agent might. Energy for the body (food) is a 
GCA for all agents; but how possession of this GCA is affected can vary from one 
agent to another in a number of different ways and for a number of different 
reasons. Judging the importance of a GCA according to the hierarchy of needfulness 
for agency is also attended by numerous complexities, which are beyond the scope 
of this paper to deal with comprehensively (but see further Beyleveld 2011). 
  
 
Part Two: Why Use the PGC? 
 
Gewirth himself argues that the PGC is categorically binding on agents because it is 
“dialectically necessary” for them to accept it. “It is dialectically necessary for Albert 
to accept the PGC” means “If Albert denies that he ought to act in accord with the 
PGC, he fails to understand what it is for him to be an agent, and by implication 
denies that he is an agent”. In effect, Gewirth tries to show that Albert cannot think 
coherently of himself as an agent if he thinks that he may act in ways that are 
inconsistent with the PGC.1 As well as supporting this argument (see, especially 
Beyleveld 1991, Beyleveld and Bos 2009, and Beyleveld 2013a), I have also argued 
that anyone who considers that all agents must be treated impartially (i.e., with 
equal concern and respect for their agency), which includes anyone who accepts 
that there are human rights as these are conceived by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights 1948 (UDHR) and international legal instruments that are designed 
to give effect to the UDHR, must accept the PGC as categorically binding (see, 
especially, Beyleveld 2011). The first argument is more ambitious because, if valid, it 
renders it dialectically necessary for agents to accept the impartiality premise 
contained within the idea of human rights, which the second argument cannot do, 
and does not purport to do, as it presumes impartiality.  However, if the second 
argument is sound, any system or theory of norms that incorporates the impartiality 
premise must be construed as governed by the PGC.  The second argument, thus, 
purports to establish that there is a rationally required convergence over a 
prescriptive content that all normative theories and systems incorporating the 
impartiality premise must accept, even though they might vary over the epistemic 
status they grant to this content. In other words, the first argument is directed at 
showing that the PGC is the supreme principle of practical reason generally, 
whereas the second is directed at showing that it is the supreme principle of 
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morality (defined as a set of categorical binding impartial requirements on action) 
as well as the supreme principle of human rights. 
 
 
First Argument 
 
The PGC is dialectically necessary for agents if three propositions are necessarily true: 
 
1. It is dialectically necessary for Albert to accept the Principle of Hypothetical 
Imperatives or Instrumental Reason (PHI), “If doing Z (or having P) is necessary 
to pursue or achieve an Albert’s chosen purpose E, then Albert ought to do Z (or 
act to secure P) or give up trying to pursue or achieve E”. 
2.  There are GCAs. 
3.  Dialectically necessary principles are universal (i.e., “objective” or “impartial” 
principles). 
 
From 1&2 it follows that 
 
4.  It is dialectically necessary for Albert to accept, “I (Albert) categorically 
instrumentally ought to defend my having the GCAs”, which is equivalent to it 
being dialectically necessary for Albert to accept “I (Albert) ought to defend my 
having the GCAs, unless I am willing to accept generic damage to my ability to 
act”. 
 
From 3&4 it follows that 
 
5.  It is dialectically necessary for Albert to accept “I (Albert) ought to respect 
Brenda (any other agent) having the GCAs unless she is willing to accept generic 
damage to her ability to act”, which is equivalent to it being dialectically 
necessary for Albert to grant Brenda the GRs under the will conception of rights, 
which is for Albert to accept the PGC.  
  
Since Albert stands for any agent, it follows that the PGC is dialectically necessary 
for all agents. 
 
Proposition 3 is the most (and very highly) contested of the three key propositions, but 
also the only one that many philosophers would wish to contest. Establishing its validity 
rests on establishing that if it is dialectically necessary for Albert to accept that he ought 
to do Z or have P then it is dialectically necessary for Albert to accept that the sufficient 
reason why he ought to do Z or have P is that he is an agent, from which it follows 
logically that Albert must hold that Brenda ought to do Z or have P, where “Brenda ought 
to do Z or have P” has the same normative force for Albert as it does for Brenda, because 
what makes Brenda an agent is the same as what makes Albert an agent.2 
 
 
Second Argument 
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This argument rests on the necessary truth of propositions 1 and 2 of the first argument, 
but does not attempt to establish the truth of proposition 3. It argues that, given the truth 
of 1 and 2, anyone who accepts that agents ought to be treated with equal concern and 
respect for their agency must accept the PGC, on pain of giving up this impartiality 
premise. This is clearly the case, because if Brian holds that he ought to act out of respect 
for Brenda’s need for the GCAS as much as he is required to act out of respect for his 
own need for the GCAs, then he must grant her the GRs.  
  
From this it follows that any theory, such as utilitarianism, contractualism, or discourse 
theory, that incorporates such impartiality, must either accept the PGC’s commands, or 
disassociate itself from this impartiality. This does not, of course, mean that these 
theories must hold that the PGC is dialectically necessary. The required commitment to 
the PGC secured by this argument is only as strong as the justification offered for the 
impartiality assumption.  But, given a commitment to the impartiality assumption, 
commitment to the PGC cannot be resisted coherently if it is dialectically necessary for 
Albert to accept the PHI and there are GCAs. 
 
This has implications for those who hold that there are human rights as currently 
conceived in international law. This is because the Preamble of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR), specifies that all “members of the human family”, all 
“human beings”, and all “human persons” are equal in inherent dignity and inalienable 
rights, and Article 1 UDHR proclaims 
 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed 
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood. 
 
If all human beings are equal in dignity and rights then all human agents (those humans 
endowed with reason and conscience) are equal in dignity and rights. Since the GCAs are 
necessary to do anything, they are also necessary to exercise any human right. So a grant 
of a human right to do anything can only be sincere if it involves a grant of a human right 
to possess the GCAs. Given the dialectical necessity of the PHI, since human agents are 
to act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood, they must accept not only that they 
categorically ought to defend their own possession of the GCAs unless they are willing to 
accept generic damage to their ability to act, but also that they categorically ought to 
respect the possession of the GCAs by every other human agent (unless the other human 
agent is willing to accept generic damage to his or her ability to act). Therefore they must 
act in accordance with the generic rights of all human agents as understood by the PGC. 
It follows, on pain of denying that all human beings are equal in dignity and inalienable 
rights, that those who accept and implement the UDHR categorically ought o consider 
that all permissible action must be consistent with the requirements of the PGC. Ergo, all 
agents purporting to interpret and implement the UDHR, and all legal instruments 
purporting to give effect to the UDHR, must do so in accordance with the PGC. Even 
though the UDHR is not itself a legally binding instrument, legally binding instruments 
such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European 
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Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) make it clear in their preambles that they exist to 
give effect to the UDHR. They can only do so on the understanding that it is rights of the 
UDHR as conceived by the UDHR that they are giving effect to. In this sense, the 
dialectical necessity of the PHI entails that the PGC is the supreme principle of human 
rights.3  
 
 
Part Three: Rights of Future Generations 
 
The following considerations/principles, some of which have already been mentioned, are 
important when applying the PGC to the question of rights of future agents. 
 
I. All agents have the GRs equally in a strictly distributive rather than in an aggregative 
manner. Thus, the strength of a right claim is unaffected by the number of current agents 
compared with the number of future agents. Certain forms of utilitarianism imply that 
there is more utility or disutility when there are more agents than when there are fewer 
agents and that the aggregated utility or disutility of a larger group counts for more than 
that of a smaller group, from which it follows that if there are more agents in the future 
than there are now then their claims to a particular GCA will outweigh our own. No such 
claims can be made under the PGC. 
 
At the individual level, conflicts between the GRs of agents are to be dealt with by using 
the criterion of needfulness for action. Although numbers do not matter in this per se, 
they can have a distributive effect. So, for example, I might (depending on my wealth and 
the value of the euro in relation to it) be duty bound to give up 5 euros to help a starving 
man. But I cannot give up 5 euros to more than a very limited number of starving people 
without ending up starving myself. But the PGC requires me to give the same weight to 
my need for the GCAs as to others’ need for GCAs. It does not, therefore, require me to 
starve myself for others, though it will let me do so voluntarily (unless my doing so 
negatively impacts on the possession of the GCAs of yet other agents against their will). 
For this reason, application at the group level imposes duties on states and other groups 
rather than on individuals (see Gewirth 1978, 312-7). This will classically be the case 
with the problems with which the rights of future generations are concerned. 
 
II. Agents have positive duties, not merely negative ones, to other agents. However, 
because assisting others to protect their GRs can impose a burden on one’s ability to 
protect one’s own GCAs in a way that merely refraining from interfering with the GCAs 
of others does not, these burdens will often require collective action, and cannot be 
imposed on all individuals equally. 
 
III. Because the GCAs must be valued only categorically instrumentally, agents have no 
intrinsic duty to preserve their own existence. Consequently, Albert can only have duties 
to preserve his own existence if the required actions are instrumental to carrying out his 
duties to other agents. So, if he is a father with responsibilities to support members of his 
family, he may not commit suicide if this will result in them suffering suffer serious 
damage to their GCAs against their will. 
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When applying this aspect of the PGC, it is important to appreciate that the fact that the 
GRs are rights under the “will” or “choice” conception of a right is not contradicted by 
the fact that they are rights to specific interests (the GCAs). What is characteristic of the 
will conception, as against an interest conception, is that the right-holder’s right imposes 
a duty on other agents to respect what the right-holder has a right to in accordance with 
the right-holder’s will. While the content of the GRs is provided by the GCAs, the form 
of these rights (their nature as rights), is determined by the way in which the claim to the 
GRs is justified, and this (via the dialectical necessity of the PHI) places action in 
accordance with the right-holder’s interests under the control of the right-holder’s will. 
 
It follows, because Albert has a duty to treat Brenda in the same way in which it is 
dialectically necessary for him to wish to be treated himself, and so has no intrinsic duty 
to maintain his own existence (the PGC not supporting, or resting on, the claim that 
agents categorically ought to exist or be brought into existence),4 that agents (like Agnes) 
do not have duties to bring other agents (like Brian) into existence unless this is necessary 
to maintain the GRs of other existing agents (like Cynthia) in accordance with their will. 
 
Regarding our duties to future generations, this has an important consequence: absent 
other considerations, current generations must ensure that they do not act now so as to 
leave future generations worse off in relation to the GCAs than they themselves are or 
else act to ensure that there are no future generations.5 
 
But other considerations cannot be ignored. For example, there is continuity between 
current generations and future generations, because future generations need to be brought 
up by previous generations. Also members of the current generation were not born, and 
are not expected to all die, at the same time. Consequently, it is not possible to make 
decisions about the existence of future generations that do not impact on the rights of 
members of the current generation. 
 
This suggests an argument for duties to protect the GCAs of future generations. Agnes 
must grant Cynthia (who, let us suppose, is younger than Agnes and will survive her) the 
GRs. Cynthia, similarly, must grant the GRs to Brian, who (let us suppose) will be born 
while Cynthia is alive but after Agnes dies. Consequently, Cynthia will have duties to 
respect Brian’s possession of the GCAs that only Brian can release Cynthia from. Now, if 
Agnes acts so as to leave Brian in a position that impairs his ability to enjoy the GCAs, 
she will interfere with Cynthia’s ability to comply with Cynthia’s PGC derived duties to 
protect Brian’s GRs (which the PGC imposes on Cynthia because she is an agent). It 
follows that Agnes must accept a duty to respect Brian’s possession of the GCAs. 
Otherwise he will fail to respect Cynthia as an agent in the way that the PGC requires.6 
 
IV. What about the non-identity problem? The argument just given is, essentially, to the 
effect that we must accept duties to future generations in order to respect the rights of 
those members of society who are/will be both our contemporaries and the 
contemporaries of (what to us are) future generations. As such, it might be said, it does 
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not address the Non-Identity Problem if this is restricted to the claim that we cannot have 
duties that are owed directly to future generations for their own sakes. 
 
Perhaps, but there are problems with the non-identity problem.  
 
To begin with, this problem only arises if we have good reason to suppose that if Agnes 
does not do X (doing X being something that will place Brian in a GCA disadvantaged 
position) then Brian will not exist. This is highly questionable. This presumption derives 
from thinking that reasoning that applies in “wrongful life” scenarios can be generally 
applied. A classical wrongful life scenario is one where a child has inherited a severe 
genetic condition from his parents, which could have been avoided by the mother having 
an abortion, and now wishes to claim damages against the mother. Here, the premise of 
the non-identity problem clearly applies. The mother could not have prevented the child 
from having this condition unless she ensured that the child would not be born. The 
premise also has some plausibility if extended to the case of a child raising a complaint 
against her mother for being damaged by the drinking or smoking habits of her mother 
during pregnancy. The union of a particular sperm and egg has an extremely low 
probability and is sensitive to very tiny changes in circumstance. Hence, it is not 
implausible to think that if the mother had changed her drinking and smoking habits so as 
to bring it about that any child she conceived would not be damaged in the way that her 
daughter is complaining about, her daughter would not have been conceived at all. But, 
for this reasoning to apply to the question of rights of members of future generations, we 
must accept the claim that if Agnes does anything other than X then Brian will never 
exist even if Brian is not a descendant of Agnes. At the very least, we must suppose that 
if sufficient people alter their behavior so as bring about better life and social conditions 
for future generations then all the members of future generations will be different from 
those who will exist if they do not alter their behaviour. This is very implausible and it 
needs to be a necessary truth to render incoherent the idea of rights of future generations 
held against us. 
 
However, the PGC framework does not need to rely on such speculative counter-
arguments or caveats. From the perspective of the PGC, the non-identity problem rests on 
a fundamental misconception about what a GR or a human right is, and in particular 
about what the conditions are for Brian to hold a right against Agnes (or any other agent). 
Under the PGC, Brian is not granted the GRs because he is Brian. He is granted the GRs 
simply because he is an agent; and what makes him an agent is just what makes any and 
every agent an agent. Because the GRs are to be accorded on the basis of possession of 
agency, the agency of every agent is to be respected as the ground of the GRs. If 
“dignity” refers to the ground of the generic rights, then to damage the agency of one 
agent against that agent’s will is an affront to the dignity of every agent. This is so 
whether the PGC is justified on the basis of the wholly dialectically necessary argument 
or merely on the argument from human rights. Given the dialectical necessity of the PHI, 
holding that human agents have rights simply by virtue of being human, also leads to the 
conclusion that agency is the ground of human rights (hence, that in which human dignity 
resides). It is, consequently, simply irrelevant whether Agnes’ actions will result in Brian 
existing or some other agent existing instead. Actions of Agnes that foreseeably threaten 
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possession of the GCAs of any agents who will exist in the future more than alternative 
actions she can perform threaten the GRs of future agents even if not performing these 
actions will mean that the population of future agents will be a completely different one. 
On the factual assumptions generating the non-identity problem, Agnes has a choice 
between GCA-threatening outcomes for Brian and GCA-respecting outcomes for, say, 
Margaret (who will exist instead of Brian), but not between GCA-threatening outcomes 
for Brian and GCA-respecting outcomes for Brian. But this is irrelevant, even if it were 
necessarily true. What matters is that Agnes, in choosing what will be a GCA-threatening 
outcome for Brian has chosen what she knows or should anticipate will be a GCA-
threatening result for an agent. She has acted contrary to the dignity (the moral status) 
that agency confers. 
  
V. What of the challenge from epistemic uncertainty? Allegedly, we cannot grant rights 
to agents who do not yet exist because we cannot know how they will like to be treated, 
what they will regard as important, and so on.  But for this to be relevant it must be the 
case that GRs must be granted as a function of the contingent preferences, choices, etc., 
that agents make. But the GRs are functions of interests (the GCAs) that agents have 
simply by being agents. The GCAs are invariant. We know that an agent will need the 
GCAs just because the agent is an agent. So, regardless of the contingent preferences that 
the agent will have, or the contingent circumstances in which the agent will exist, an 
agent must be accorded the GRs as soon as the agent comes into being.7 
 
VI. GRs are unaffected by an inability to enforce them. Any idea that Brian cannot have a 
right against Agnes because he cannot enforce his claim against her (because he will not 
exist while Agnes is alive) is alien to the PGC framework, which operates with a strictly 
normative as against positive conception of a right, which is to say that it distinguishes 
between the conditions for having a right and the conditions for enforcing a right.8 Again, 
this is because agents have the GRs simply because they are agents.  
 
Consequently, the fact that Agnes cannot now be in contact with Brian can no more affect 
that Brian holds the GRs against Agnes than the fact that Brenda and Albert 
(contemporaries) are not currently in contact with each other can affect that Brenda holds 
the GRs against Albert. That an agent will foreseeably be the recipient of my actions is 
all that matters. It does not have to be some particular agent, because, under the PGC any 
agent stands for all agents when what is at stake is possession of the GCAs. 
 
So, if I am Robinson Crusoe and there is no one else around on my island, this does not 
mean that I do not have duties to other agents, simply because they are not around for me 
to interact with. If and when they (e.g. Friday) arrive on the island I will have to respect 
their generic rights. This will not be because their appearance on the island created these 
rights: Friday will have had these rights all along, which are rights to have his need for 
the GCAS respected if and when he becomes a recipient of my actions, which is to say 
when my actions impact on his GCAs.  
 
But, to apply this to future generations, we need to imagine that while Friday is not 
present, Robinson is anticipating his invited arrival. Indeed, to make it closer still, we 
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should imagine that Robinson will have left the island before Friday arrives and will not 
be able to come back. The question to be asked is, “Must Robinson ameliorate his 
behaviour to ensure that (if/when) Friday arrives, Friday will be able to enjoy his 
GCAs?”  
 
In general terms, the answer must be affirmative. If Robinson is not going to keep the 
island in a condition that enables Friday to have the GCAs, he should not have invited 
him there, or (if possible) should at least have warned him about the conditions that the 
island will be in when he arrives. The latter cannot, however, apply to future generations 
because they do not have a choice whether to be brought into existence or not. 
 
VII. Inequality between present and future generations must, in principle, be treated just 
like inequality within generations. Again, this is because agents have the GRs simply 
because they are agents,  
 
However, this does not mean that there are no differences between the ways in which we 
may act towards current and future generations. For one thing, if I have a generic need 
now, I have a prima facie right to attend to it. That I suspect that this will damage the 
GCAs of future generations, does not mean that I may not attend to it.  If it is not 
implausible that science will find ways to ameliorate the effects of an overuse of relevant 
resources by the time that Brian comes into being, Agnes might be able to justify using 
current resources in a way that would leave Brian worse off than herself on the 
happenstance that such innovation does not occur. In other words, there are limits to the 
precautionary measures that we need to take to protect future generations. But we must 
be careful here. The situation is very different when we are talking about using resources 
to meet our basic needs from when we are talking about using them to meet merely non-
subtractive, let alone, merely additive needs. It is one thing for Brazilians to chop down 
the Amazon rain forest when and if they need to do so to make a living. It is another for 
wealthy persons, already enjoying a lifestyle that fully satisfies basic needs (and more), to 
engage activities that threaten basic GCAs in order to further enhance their own quality 
of life. 
 
VIII. Wealthy current societies bear more responsibilities to future generations than do 
poorer societies. This is for exactly the same reasons and in the same ways that they bear 
greater responsibilities to poorer current societies. The responsibilities go in two 
directions. They go in the direction of inhibition of further improving their own 
conditions (unless such improvement is not merely necessary but will be used to improve 
the lot of the less well off more than simply trying to redistribute existing resources more 
equally). John Rawls’ Maximin Principle is in line with this. They also go in the direction 
that the wealthier have a duty to contribute more to any redistribution of resources that is 
required. 
 
However, this does not mean that poorer societies have no responsibilities to future 
generations. For example, in some poorer/traditional cultures, having many children is 
seen as a necessary means to ensure a decent level of existence in one’s old age. This has 
come about because of the very high mortality rates that are historically a feature of such 
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societies. Advances in medicine and the like have, however, led to a higher proportion of 
children surviving, thus putting greater burdens on resources. This renders the custom of 
having many children very counterproductive, and also illustrates that the application of 
the PGC cannot be reduced to a set of simple rules as against principles for consideration 
under the rubric of the PGC. 
  
IX. Agents have duties to respect the interests of apparent non-agents, even though the 
PGC grants the GRs only to agents, the relevant interests being those of apparent non-
agents that agents are able to respect that apparent non-agents would have rights to if they 
were agents, with the strength of these interests being proportional to how closely an 
apparent non-agent approaches being an apparent agent (see e.g., Beyleveld and Pattinson 
2000; 2010). While this has no direct bearing on the rights of future generations, any 
duties to the environment that can be generated by such considerations impose duties on 
the current generation that require behaviour that reduces the likelihood of actions that 
will negatively impact on future generations (cf. Gewirth 2001, Düwell 2014). 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter I have tried to explain the PGC and I have also sketched middle order 
principles and the general lines of thinking that come into play when trying to apply the 
PGC to the question of the rights of future generations. To flesh this out fully requires 
detailed case studies and scenarios for application and I have not put any of these forward 
for consideration. 
 
I readily acknowledge that the arguments presented against objections to the idea of 
rights of future generations are not uniquely available to Gewirthians. They can and 
should be deployed by all moral theories that operate with the idea that there are rights 
that are possessed simply by virtue of being human or being an agent. 
 
Indeed, not incompatible arguments are presented against the non-identity problem by, 
e.g., Baier (1981) and Bell (2011) in the specific context of anthropogenic climate 
change, while others have claimed, more broadly, that rights-based accounts assist with 
countering different versions of non-identity problems (e.g. Feinberg 1981, Woodward 
1986, Elliot 1989, Elliot 1997, Partridge 1990).9  
 
However, the Gewirthian approach is special in being grounded upon the strict rational 
necessity for agents of the PHI. This basis, whether or not it is extended to establish the 
PGC as dialectically necessary, or involves the additional presumption of impartiality 
inherent in the idea of a human right as currently conceived in international law (without 
arguing that it is strictly rationally necessary to accept that there are such human rights) 
provides a sufficient solution to the non-identity problem, even if the highly contestable 
factual premises driving this challenge are true. This is because such a grounding 
abstracts from all person-specific, individualistic aspects that give rise to the non-identity 
problem, while nevertheless starting from an agential perspective. Consequently, it 
retains the idea that immoral acts are acts that harm agents without relying on the notion 
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of “harming” in the sense of comparative harm or making a particular person/agent worse 
off. Similarly, it defuses the challenge from epistemic uncertainty by focusing the content 
of rights on GCAs that are interests necessarily held by all agents. This is because, at 
root, it sees a right, not as the product of contingent choices made, but as a logical 
consequence of the dialectical necessity of the PHI for agents. 
 
Additionally, the PGC Framework, through the GCAs being the content of fundamental 
rights provides a rational procedure for adjudicating between conflicting rights that has 
the stringency of justification enjoyed by the PHI itself. And this has application within 
any theory of duties or rights. 
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1 This interprets Kant’s claim that a categorical imperative is one “connected (competely 
a priori) with the concept of the will of a rational being as such” (1785, 4:426) (see 
Beyleveld 2013b). 
2 See, in particular, Beyleveld 2013a. 
3 See further Beyleveld 2011.  
4 The PGC does not require agents to treat others as they wish to be treated themselves, 
which would permit a sado-masochist to torture others against their will. The dialectical 
necessity of the PHI (the PGC being the universalization of the PHI, given recognition of 
the existence of GCAs) requires Albert to treat Brenda as Brenda must wish herself to be 
treated, which is to have her possession of the GCAs disposed of in accordance with her 
own will. 
5 However, because it will be impossible in practice to reach agreement on a decision not 
to have any children in the future, the latter option is not a realistic strategy to avoid 
responsibility for our actions in relation to future generations. 
 
The fact that the Gewirthian approach operates with the will conception also does not 
create difficulties for its application to future geenrations on account of the fact that 
Agnes does not know whether Brian is prepared to suffer generic damage to his ability to 
act on account of her actions. Or, rather, the difficulty is no different from that faced by a 
doctor who is presented with an unconscious agent patient who needs life-saving 
treatment, for which the doctor ideally needs the patient’s consent because the operation 
will affect the patient’s GCAs. The rational solution is to presume that the patient wishes 
to be treated unless there is explicit evidence to the contrary (like an advance directive), 
not merely on the ground that most agents would wish treatment, but because (all things 
being equal) on the scale of degree of needfulness it is worse to fail to treat a patient who 
wishes life-saving treatment (the result is irreversible) than to treat a patient who does not 
wish life-saving treatment (the result is not necessarily irreversible: the patient could 
regain consciousness and refuse continued treatment). 
6 Compare the treatment of Gosseries (2008) of this kind of scenario. I owe reference to 
the scenario to Gerhard Bos at Utrecht, who has a slightly different take on it in as yet 
unpublished papers he has presented at conferences we have attended. 
7 However, although agents do not have a GR to their non-generic interests (their 
particular-occurrent interests) as such, they do have a GR to pursue their particular 
occurrent interests to the extent that this pursuit does not interfere with the GCAs of other 
agents. But interference with the particular occurrent interests of other agents is 
inevitable in social life. To deal with such conflicts, the PGC prescribes that agents must 
be given the right to have their views on the pursuit of their particular occurrent interests 
represented and decided upon in a democratic way. This raises questions about how 
future not yet existing agents can be granted this right (which must be separated from the 
question as to whether they must be granted this right), since we do not know what their 
particular occurrent interests and choices will be. This issue is addressed in Beyleveld, 
Düwell and Spahn (2015). 
8 It must, however, be recognized, as a point of fact, not as a normative principle, that the 
prospects of getting the current generation to honour its duties to future generations are 
even worse than those of getting it to comply with its intra-generational duties. To put it 
cynically, this is simply because future generations are not in any position to fight back.  
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Disadvantaged members of the current generation may be at a disadvantage in fighting 
their cause; but they are not powerless. Members of future generations have absolutely no 
power to affect the actions of the current generation by their own actions, simply because 
they do not already exist. Future generations will just be stuck with what we leave them 
with and will not be able to hold us to account. For this reason, contractualism, 
particularly of the kind advocated by David Gauthier (1986) is in a very poor position to 
render itself consistent with the PGC. 
9 There is also a rich literature on the wrongful life case of Parfit’s non-identity problem, 
discussing the moral and legal aspects of cases of children with diseases such as 
Huntington’s disease or hereditary deafness (e.g., Harris 1990, Shiffrin 1999, Steinbock 
2011). 
